2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

29 June 2005

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Summary record of the 13th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 11 May 2005, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. de Queiroz Duarte	(Brazil)
later:	Mr. Heinsberg (Vice-President)	(Germany)
later:	Mr. de Queiroz Duarte (President)	(Brazil)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **The President** welcomed the representatives of 119 NGOs throughout the world who had come to participate in the 2005 Review Conference and express their organizations' views on nuclear proliferation and disarmament. Just the week before, he had met representatives of Mayors for Peace and *Hibakusha* (atomic-bomb survivors), and had received petitions from the Mayors for Peace campaign (known as the 2020 Vision Campaign) for the abolition of nuclear weapons by 2020 and from the Citizens Campaign. NGOs played a key role in strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, and their expertise and dedication were crucial in the effort to reach a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. The current meeting, convened pursuant to the agreement reached at the third session of the Preparatory Committee and in conformity with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, provided another opportunity to hear grass-roots concerns. He was convinced that the joint voice of civil society would give further impetus to the Conference's efforts to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

2. **Ms. Hall** (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War), speaking on behalf of all the NGOs participating in the Conference, said that NGOs played an important role in international decision-making, as they allowed citizens across the globe to partake in the political process and make their voices heard. The NGOs present today represented millions of people worldwide who wanted to live in a nuclear-weapon-free world where Governments were mature enough to resolve conflicts through more effective, non-lethal methods. They endorsed the 2020 Vision Campaign. Year after year, nuclear disarmament NGOs had participated in the NPT Review Conference in order to promote a nuclear-weapon-free world with equal emphasis on all three pillars of the Treaty. Contrary to some people's opinions, it was extremely important to acknowledge that the NPT was in crisis — as the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change itself had done — if it was to work as intended. Indeed, NGOs and States parties had a common responsibility to stop the further erosion of, and strengthen, the NPT, which had set the global norms for non-proliferation and disarmament for 35 years and remained a fundamental stepping stone towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. After appealing to all States parties to work tirelessly to preserve and strengthen the Treaty, she urged the Conference to consider the reasons why the various NGOs present had concluded that nuclear weapons in today's world were of no use at all and their consequent recommendations.

3. Despite the end of the cold war thousands of nuclear weapons remained on hair-trigger alert and could go off by accident or through unauthorized use, and despite the NPT there were now nine nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear technology was already available on the black market. If the NPT regime fell apart, there would doubtless be dozens of nuclear-weapon States and no controls. As long as some States had nuclear weapons it was difficult to tell others not to acquire them. And yet the nuclear-weapon States were modernizing their arsenals, planning new types of nuclear weapons and reducing the threshold for their use. The major threats facing the world today — such as life-threatening diseases, poverty, climate change and civil war — could not be averted through possession of nuclear weapons.

4. One had only to recall the Asian tsunami of 2004 to question why billions were being spent on missile defence and nuclear weapons rather than being invested in technology to promote human security. Every disarmament measure built confidence and freed up resources for real security measures, while possession of nuclear weapons made States a nuclear target themselves. In the event of nuclear war, health services would break down and many people would die a terrible death without medical relief. People who were prepared to give their life for a cause would not be deterred by any threat, including a nuclear threat. At the same time, the very existence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials made the world more vulnerable to attack by non-State actors. Though it might seem a long way off, abolition was the only way and the sooner steps were taken towards it, the sooner it would be achieved. The more closely NGOs and States parties worked together, the more likely it was that they would achieve their common goals of peace, security and sustainability.

5. *Mr. Heinsberg (Germany), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

6. **Ms. Sundberg** (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom) said that it was essential to

build confidence in universal, not selective, compliance with the Treaty. The best way to do that was to increase transparency, which was not only an obligation for States under the 13 practical steps, but also in their own interests, as it enabled them to indicate the steps they had taken to further the Treaty's goals. Contrary to some critics' opinions, the reports submitted so far provided substantive and detailed information, thereby increasing transparency and demonstrating that States took their NPT obligations seriously. The three Preparatory Committee sessions held since the adoption of the reporting obligation in 2000 had achieved a much greater degree of transparency. Although the institutionalization of reporting was progressing slowly, 39 of the 188 NPT States parties, including 25 of the 40 NPT States parties listed in annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), had submitted at least one report. However, while all the nuclear-weapon States offered some form of information exchange, to date none of them had submitted an official report. Official reports were important as they were translated and included in the meeting record, a much more effective way of increasing transparency. In that regard, she called on all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and annex 2 States, to submit substantive reports detailing steps taken to implement the Treaty and to endorse the reporting obligation at the current Conference. She also called on nuclear-weapon States to report on national holdings of warheads (both within and outside national borders), delivery vehicles and fissile materials; operational status of nuclear weapons; disarmament initiatives and reduction strategies; strategic doctrine; and security assurances.

7. The other way to improve transparency was to increase access by, and participation of, NGOs in the review process. Civil society provided a critical link between Governments and the general public. As a 2003 Canadian working paper had noted, the contribution of nuclear disarmament NGOs was key in nurturing public concern and political will, advancing global norms, enhancing transparency, monitoring compliance, framing public understanding and providing expert analysis. The 2004 report of the Cardoso Panel on United Nations Relations with Civil Society had also concluded that enhancing dialogue and cooperation with civil society would make the United Nations more effective. However, despite their important contribution, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation NGOs had less access to international meetings than NGOs focusing on issues such as human rights, disabilities and humanitarian affairs, and NGO access had been further restricted at the current Conference: NGOs had been allocated only one three-hour session during a four-week conference, while the decision to hold meetings in the General Assembly Hall had prevented their representatives from engaging in consultations or leaving materials on the tables provided specifically for that purpose. She welcomed the fact that NGOs had been granted access to the cluster debates for the first time in 2004 and looked forward to greater access to both proceedings and delegates when the Main Committees began to meet. She called for: all meetings not devoted to negotiations to be held in open session; NGOs to be provided with appropriate seating and all documentation during open sessions; NGOs to be given additional opportunities to participate in thematic discussions; increased dialogue between Governments and NGOs; and NGOs from underrepresented regions to be given financial and logistical support by the Conference secretariat and/or States parties. Such practices should be codified in the Final Document of the current Conference. Global support and understanding of disarmament and non-proliferation was key to ensuring compliance with the NPT and could not be achieved without increased transparency so that Governments could be held accountable for the full implementation of all their NPT obligations by the people they claimed to represent.

8. **Mr. Ellsberg** (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation), paying tribute to a man who had acted courageously in support of transparency, said that in 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, a technician at Israel's secret nuclear weapons production facility at Dimona, had rightly revealed truths about Israel's nuclear activities that had long been denied by his Government. He had revealed not only that Israel was a nuclear-weapon State, as had been known for over a decade, but also that the international community had substantially underestimated the pace and scale of Israel's secret production of nuclear materials and warheads. New estimates based on his revelations put the Israeli arsenal in 1986 at some 200 warheads (rather than 20) and currently at close to 400, which would make Israel the fourth largest nuclear power after France, and possibly the third largest after the United States and Russia.

9. Surely, Israeli citizens and the international community as a whole had deserved to know the facts and Vanunu's example of truth-telling, at great personal risk, should be emulated. The nuclear scientist Joseph Rotblat had long argued that confidence in inspection and enforcement agreements on nuclear disarmament could and must rest in part on "societal verification", in other words, on the courage and conscience of scientists, technicians and officials who could reveal to inspectors activities violating those agreements. Unhappily, since the NPT had entered into force, there had been few such examples, even though the potential value of such revelations was increasingly clear. Had an Indian citizen with knowledge of his Government's secret preparations for nuclear testing spoken out in time, both the Indian test and the Pakistani one that it had been sure to provoke could have been averted. Though the person concerned might well have received a long prison sentence, such an act would surely have deserved a Nobel Peace Prize, for which Rotblat had nominated Vanunu repeatedly.

10. Currently, a year after serving his full 18-year sentence, Vanunu was facing a return to prison for violating restrictions on his freedom of speech that clearly violated his fundamental human rights. He would, however, continue to speak out in favour of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the global abolition of nuclear weapons, telling whatever he knew to support those objectives. Claims that further revelations could undermine Israel's national security were absurd, as no such damage had been identified since his revelations in 1986. Rather, the fact that he was prohibited from speaking to foreign citizens on any matters or to Israeli citizens on nuclear matters was clearly intended to punish him indefinitely. In a world where more people like Vanunu were desperately needed, above all in nuclear-weapon States violating their article VI obligations, such a clear deterrent message should not go unchallenged. In the interests of vital transparency and future societal verification, the international community should protest Vanunu's new indictment and the restrictions on his speech and travel. In that regard, he urged those present to lodge their protest with the Oslo office of the International Peace Bureau.

11. It was time for the rest of the world to join Mordechai Vanunu in demanding that Israel should recognize its status as a nuclear-weapon State with a large and growing arsenal and that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States and Russia, should negotiate a definite timetable towards the global, verified abolition of nuclear weapons.

12. Lastly, he felt compelled to add that he regretted profoundly that he had not released the documents that he himself had written while working as a consultant on nuclear war plans and nuclear command and control at the Pentagon in the early 1960s, as they would have revealed the true nature of those war plans to the world. The idea of such action had not occurred to him until Vanunu had set the example. He urged States parties to bring pressure to bear on Israel and to demand that Mordechai Vanunu should be released so that he could work for the cause of abolition.

13. **Ms. Cabasso** (Western States' Legal Foundation) said that the optimistic claim by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States ahead of the 1995 Conference that the nuclear arms race had ceased had proved false. While the quantitative trend was currently downward, nuclear Powers, with the possible exception of China, were engaged in the qualitative modernization of nuclear forces. Any claim by them that modernization was the inevitable by-product of the replacement of existing systems would suggest that they had no intention of eliminating their nuclear weapons for decades to come. Moreover, in some cases modernization clearly amounted to an arms race. Both the CTBT and the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty would have capped the arms race if they had been agreed to at an early date, as intended. Even today, they could help prevent an arms race. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had neither taken initiatives to stop the modernization of nuclear forces, nor made an effort to increase transparency or lower the readiness of forces. Such steps could and should be taken by the United Kingdom, France and China, who tended to hide behind the argument that global elimination must await deep reductions in United States and Russian Federation forces.

14. In the United Kingdom, the submarine-launched Trident missile, equipped with three to four warheads, was the only remaining operational nuclear weapon system. According to its most recent annual report, the mission of the Atomic Weapons Establishment was to maintain a capability to provide warheads for a successor system without recourse to nuclear testing. A decision on whether or not to replace the Trident system would most likely be made in the newly elected

Parliament. France, meanwhile, continued to design and build new weapon systems for use through 2040 — including a new submarine-launched missile and longer-range cruise missile, both equipped with new warheads — and had a highly advanced programme to develop the capability to design and manufacture modified or new nuclear weapons without explosive nuclear testing. China was currently replacing its 20 silo-based long-range missiles with a longer-range variant and was developing a new mobile intermediate-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which could be deployed by the end of the decade, as well as a longer-range variant. As for its ballistic missile submarine force, it was currently working to replace the experimental missile with a more reliable, medium-range missile and was developing a new submarine.

15. The Russian Federation was developing a new manoeuvrable warhead capable of avoiding missile defences and continued to manufacture single-warhead silo-launched missiles, with the deployment of a road-mobile multiple-warhead variant scheduled for 2006. While slowly retiring multiple-warhead land-based nuclear missiles, it was building up single-warhead missiles. Development of a new-generation ICBM, capable of carrying up to 10 warheads, was reportedly under way, while a nuclear variant of a new bomber-carried cruise missile might be deployed in 2005, and a new submarine-launched missile would be deployed on two submarines under construction. The Russian Federation was restructuring its deployed strategic force as it and the United States reduced towards 2,200 deployed strategic warheads by 2012, as required by the Moscow Treaty. However, the Russian Federation was also clearly modernizing and replacing existing systems, apparently with the intention of relying on nuclear forces indefinitely. The United States spent about $40 billion annually on nuclear forces, more than the total military budget for almost every other country. Its modernization programme covered, inter alia, existing Minuteman land-based missiles and their supporting infrastructure, Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable long-range bombers, while research was under way on new delivery systems, such as more accurate alternatives to land-based ICBMs. The goal of the programme was to maintain United States qualitative superiority in nuclear war-fighting capabilities in the 2020-2040 time frame. The lifetime of a number of warheads had been or would be extended, while funding had been granted for research into a reliable replacement warhead and requested for a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Work was also progressing on technology upgrades to increase United States capabilities to plan and execute nuclear strikes, including software to assess likely "collateral damage". Lastly, the United States intended to maintain indefinitely sufficient "responsive infrastructure" to enable timely reconstitution to larger force levels, if needed, field new or modified nuclear weapons to respond to a stockpile "surprise" or meet new requirements, and ensure readiness to conduct an underground nuclear test, if necessary. To that end, the United States was spending billions of dollars on sophisticated research facilities and planned to build a new factory to produce plutonium pits (the spheres at the core of hydrogen bombs). Over 12,000 pits from dismantled nuclear weapons were currently in storage, ready to be used if new nuclear weapons were produced. Production of radioactive hydrogen-tritium had also resumed.

16. Given such a vast array of activities, it was safe to conclude that, led by the United States, the nuclear-weapon States were modernizing their nuclear arsenals, to the extent of engaging in an arms race, and planned to retain large nuclear forces for many decades to come.

17. **Mr. Spies** (Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy), referring to the practical steps adopted in 2000 as an indispensable guide in respect of the requirement under NPT article VI of good-faith negotiations on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, said that those steps, and the principles of verification, transparency and irreversibility underpinning them, were currently as relevant as they had been at the time of their adoption. Noting that States should not go back on their freely given word, he stressed that the practical steps had been agreed by consensus.

18. While the nuclear-weapon States had failed to agree on the establishment of a body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, there were two commitments entered into in 2000 that were essential in that regard. The first was the commitment to specific agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear-weapons systems, on which he noted that there had been little progress. The second and particularly important commitment was to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that those weapons would ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. While

China had honoured that commitment, the same could not be said of France, Russia, the United Kingdom or the United States. Indeed, in the case of the last-mentioned country, the range of circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used had actually been enlarged. He quoted in that connection official sources advocating an enhanced role for nuclear weapons in the country's security. He emphasized that it was invidious to the peoples of the world for supposed security to rest on a morally repugnant nuclear balance of terror.

19. **Mr. Burroughs** (Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy) highlighted the obligation recognized by the International Court of Justice for States to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, which would itself represent progress towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. He said that some nuclear-weapon States still made progress towards nuclear disarmament dependent on progress on other aspects of disarmament and security, even though there was no legal link between elimination of nuclear arsenals and comprehensive demilitarization. There were however practical links in that both a verification regime for the ban on biological weapons and a regime preventing the weaponization of outer space would give the nuclear-weapon States greater confidence in moving towards the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

20. Clearly, the United States was not well placed to lecture other States about obligations of general and complete disarmament having put an end in 2001 to seven years of negotiations on a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention and currently continuing to develop conventional weapons. If the United States wished to insist on the importance of progress towards general and complete disarmament for the achievement of nuclear abolition, it should first look to itself. He noted in conclusion that article VI provided an excellent road map for nuclear disarmament and that, as such, it should be reaffirmed by the Review Conference.

21. *Mr. de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil), President, took the Chair.*

22. **Ms. Caldicott** (Nuclear Policy Research Institute), warning against the imminent danger of annihilation facing the world through the use and development of nuclear technology, said that, contrary to what was claimed, nuclear power was not emission-free and that it contributed to global warming. Nor was sufficient attention given to the cost, not only of uranium enrichment, but also, and more particularly, of a nuclear accident, the decommissioning of all existing and new nuclear reactors, and the transporting and storage of radioactive waste for between 250 and 500 millenniums. While Belgium, Germany, Spain and Sweden had decided to phase out their nuclear reactors, China, the United Kingdom and the United States were planning to construct more of them.

23. Nuclear power was neither green nor clean. Massive quantities of radioactive isotopes were regularly released into the air and water by nuclear reactors, causing genetic disease. Radioactive waste was steadily building up at reactor sites throughout the world, none of which had plans for preventing the release of toxic carcinogenic material into the biosphere, where it would contaminate the food chain for the rest of time. Moreover, radioactive waste offered an attractive target for terrorist sabotage.

24. She described the long-lasting and devastating effects of four of the most dangerous elements made in nuclear power plants, namely, iodine 131, strontium 90, caesium 137 and plutonium 239, pointing out moreover that the amount of plutonium produced by each nuclear-power plant in a year could be used to manufacture 40 nuclear bombs.

25. In conclusion, she called for a supplementary protocol to the NPT which would enable the signatory States to fulfil their article IV obligations by supplying technical aid in the form of renewable-energy technologies and would serve as a basis for an international renewable energy agency.

26. **Mr. de Brum** (Lolelaplap Trust), speaking out of personal experience, described the traumatic effects of the United States atomic and thermonuclear testing programme in the Marshall Islands, which had sustained the equivalent of 1.6 Hiroshima explosions every day for the 12 years of its duration. Those effects were not confined to detonations but were extended through the experimental exposure of the population to radiation. Following the atomic tests, and despite its initial claims that there was no positive link between the tests and the physical health of the Marshallese, the United States had recently predicted a 50 per cent rise in the resulting incidence of cancer in the Marshall Islands.

27. Although the testing had ended 48 years before, the effects of radiation exposure, including malformations, abnormal diseases and birth anomalies, were still being felt, as was the social disarray attendant upon evacuation. He alleged that the United States nuclear activities in the Marshall Islands had been self-serving and irresponsible and that the United States had withheld scientific information for fear that the Marshallese might make overreaching demands on it if the full facts were known about the damage done, in particular to Enewetak.

28. He also called into question the assurances given by the United States Government that, following the termination of the United Nations trusteeship which it had administered, it would continue to be responsible for the affected communities.

29. After years of ICBM testing, the Marshall Islands was currently hosting the United States Government's anti-missile shield testing programme, which again was impacting every aspect of the lives of the local people and their natural environment. The people of Kwajalein had consequently been removed from their homeland and crowded into the excessively confined and squalid space of a neighbouring island, while the surrounding seas were being harmed by depleted uranium and other substances, despite protests from the Kwajalein leadership.

30. Speaking on behalf of the indigenous communities, which he said were having to pay disproportionately for the creation, deployment and storage of weapons, he called on the international community to assist the people of the Marshall Islands in overcoming the legacy of the nuclear age and in alleviating the burden of serving as testing-ground for weapons of mass destruction. The security of indigenous people consisted in their right to healthy land, resources and bodies, and the world's leaders could not be allowed to take that right away in the interests of their own security.

31. **Mr. Zeller** (Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League) said that reprocessing plutonium waste for fuel placed public safety and the environment at serious risk and undermined the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League was deeply troubled by the provisions of a bilateral plutonium disposition agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation that allowed each nation to use 34,000 kilograms of plutonium waste from nuclear warheads in civilian nuclear electric power plants.

32. Near the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, which had been polluted by five decades of atomic-weapons manufacturing, the death rate was 19.8 per cent above normal, largely from heart disease and cancer, both of which were associated with ionizing radiation. A similar problem was caused by the Mayak industrial complex, which had produced plutonium for the first Soviet atomic bomb, and the Siberian Chemical Combine within the complex, which had pumped radioactive poisons into underground aquifers for over 40 years. While many residents of the area had been evacuated, the nearby town of Muslumovo remained inhabited and its people feared they had been singled out as Muslim "guinea pigs" in a horrible radioactive experiment. The League was concerned about plans by the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Minatom) to build a new plutonium fuel factory on the site of the Siberian Chemical Combine, using technology supplied by the French firm COGEMA, and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's recent decision to authorize the construction of a similar factory at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

33. Plutonium fuel production would create enormous amounts of radioactive waste and would require the transportation of weapons-grade plutonium and fresh fuel across thousands of miles of open country, creating a serious risk of railway accidents that could result in plutonium contamination of the environment. Plutonium utilization in ageing Russian reactors could lead to proliferation from civil reactor sites. In the United States, Duke Energy, which had been granted an exemption from post-11 September security measures to operate its plutonium fuel test reactor, would be depending on unreliable baskets of ice for cooling during an emergency.

34. Immobilization provided an alternative to plutonium fuel, which was difficult to handle, store and transport. Mixing the plutonium with liquid glass and radioactive waste would avoid risks to human health, save hundreds of millions of dollars and pave the way for a more sensible non-proliferation policy. Plutonium must not be used as fuel in civil reactors, must be kept at well-protected sites and must be immobilized in order to prevent smuggling and reuse in nuclear weapons.

35. The 13 practical steps to implement article VI of the Treaty set out by the 2000 Review Conference, particularly the tenth step regarding fissile material, formed a basis for opposing plutonium reprocessing. Under the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program of the United States and the Russian Federation, however, fissile material would be transferred from public management to private, commercial control and no longer be subject to effective international verification. It was the League's view that the scope of a fissile materials cut-off treaty should be expanded to include a ban on civilian plutonium production. It also urged Japan to abandon its plans to open the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in 2007 as the first commercial-scale plant in a non-nuclear-weapon State.

36. Nuclear non-proliferation would be undermined by the circulation of plutonium fuel in the commercial sector. It would increase the risk of diversion, and there was no way to ensure that plutonium processing facilities for electric power would not be used for military purposes.

37. **Ms. Wasley** (International Peace Pilgrimage) and **Ms. Keim** (NPT Youth Action), delivering a joint statement on behalf of the youth of the world, reminded States parties to the Treaty of their primary obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to save future generations from the scourge of war. Unfortunately, the moral and democratic values implanted in children at school, at home, and by books and the media were not upheld by those in power. Indeed, the five permanent members of the Security Council with the right of veto were also the declared nuclear-weapon States. The youth of the world recommended a restructuring of the Security Council that would be equitable and maintain the democratic process.

38. It was particularly regrettable that long-standing nuclear-weapon States, such as the United States, were adopting new doctrines in support of proliferation and were planning the development of new nuclear weapons. In general, nuclear arsenals around the world were being developed in defiance of the disarmament obligations enshrined in the NPT.

39. The youth of the world called for an end to the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament through the negotiation of a nuclear-weapons convention, the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to five years earlier and the establishment of a subsidiary body to monitor compliance with disarmament commitments. The adoption of the 2020 Vision Campaign of the Mayors for Peace — the only plan that included a specific timetable and target date for the abolition of all nuclear weapons — would be an even more effective step. Children learned in school that rules were to be obeyed and laws must be respected, and yet the mighty and powerful in the international community disregarded the ruling of their own International Court of Justice, putting their national interests first.

40. The youth of the world aspired to a future in which nations were bound by mutual respect and international law. They called for an immediate, unqualified and total abolition of all nuclear weapons for the well-being of all peoples and future generations.

41. **Ms. Naughton** (British-American Security Information Council) said that the Council regarded the nuclear forces deployed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as highly contentious and counterproductive. In addition to the strategic weapons provided by the United States, France and the United Kingdom and the substrategic or tactical nuclear weapons of the United States, five non-nuclear-weapon States — Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey — had entered into nuclear-sharing arrangements with the United States, while the United Kingdom was host to both United States nuclear weapons and aircraft and pilots of the United States Air Force.

42. Recently, however, other European States had begun to question nuclear sharing. The Council welcomed the call by Belgium parliamentarians, and others in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, for the removal of NATO nuclear weapons from Europe. In their opening statements, the representative of Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and the representative of Egypt had also been critical of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.

43. For one thing, the sharing arrangements were an apparent breach of article II of the Treaty, which prohibited non-nuclear States from receiving the transfer of nuclear weapons. The United States interpretation, namely, that the sharing arrangement did not constitute a transfer until such time as war was declared, had been called into question by Mexico and

the Non-Aligned Movement at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and a few years later by Egypt and the New Agenda Coalition.

44. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference contained a number of commitments that were relevant to NATO, including further unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals, increased transparency, further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, further reduction in the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems and a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

45. Noting that the number of United States nuclear warheads based in Europe had remained static since 1994, she said that the NATO nuclear posture interfered with negative security assurances and the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Europe. Its refusal to rule out first use of nuclear weapons was a major obstacle to strengthening negative security assurances as proposed by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The United States and the United Kingdom had renewed their bilateral mutual defence agreement in 2004 for another ten years, and the United States had a mutual defence agreement with France as well.

46. The Council called on the United States to withdraw all remaining nuclear weapons from Europe. The weapons were militarily obsolete and no longer relevant to trans-Atlantic relations. It also urged NATO to consider a diminished role for nuclear weapons and a commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons as a first step towards their complete removal from European soil. The United States and the Russian Federation should negotiate a viable treaty on the elimination of all substrategic or tactical nuclear weapons, and France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom should terminate all nuclear-weapon modernization and replacement programmes. Lastly, the Review Conference should declare that the Treaty was binding at all times and in all circumstances.

47. **Mr. Fellmer** (International Law Campaign) said that the interrelationship between non-proliferation and disarmament was inherent in the basic promise of the Treaty, and that there were time constraints on disarmament. Abolition was the key to building confidence among the negotiating partners and to preventing the rise of clandestine nuclear programmes. He urged the current Review Conference not to conduct further debate on the 13 practical steps, including the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, but rather to discuss means of ensuring their implementation.

48. The inherent flaw in the Treaty was to be found in article IV, as pointed out in the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report. Safeguarding could only accomplish so much; where there was free trade in nuclear technology and materials, abuse was inevitable, as it was impossible to account for all the material in large reprocessing plants like Sellafield, the Hague or Rokkashaw. All enrichment and reprocessing facilities must be placed under multilateral control, and a complete moratorium must be declared on the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium.

49. IAEA should not be promoting the use of nuclear energy in any form. While many countries equated nuclear programmes with development, in fact, truly developed countries were investing in cleaner and renewable sources of energy. There was a pressing need to establish an international agency for renewable energy to assist countries in building up energy supplies that did not rely on nuclear energy or fossil fuels.

50. North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners should not offer encouragement to nuclear-weapon States by agreeing to the deployment of nuclear weapons in their territory or to nuclear-sharing and planning arrangements. States should adopt legislation that went beyond Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) by criminalizing State, as well as non-State, actors, for engaging in activities related to weapons of mass destruction. He stressed the urgency of initiating negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention to supplement the NPT, and provide the legal basis for the universal criminalization of nuclear-weapons activities already declared illegal under international law and by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion. The International Law Campaign was of the view that, since weapons of mass destruction had already been declared illegal under international law, nuclear weapons, by their very nature, were also illegal.

51. **Ms. Perlman** (Psychologists for Social Responsibility), after noting the paradoxical nature of nuclear weapons, which allowed humankind to coexist with the threat of annihilation while at the same time

feeling safer, said that the psychic numbing, denial and fear induced by the magnitude of the danger, coupled with overconfidence and delusions of control, interfered with optimal thought and action and could have irreversible unintended consequences. Reaction under stress to a perceived attack was conducive to poor judgement and ignored undesirable long-term consequences. The effect of States' policies on other States often played into the latter's fears and fantasies. Thus, nuclear-weapon-States were providing incentives for other nations to develop weapons to deter a perceived threat of attack. Threats, violence and coercion were seen as more effective than non-violent strategies.

52. The desire for nuclear weapons was a symptom of something deeper, of a belief that the possession of nuclear weapons and power were inextricably linked. Weaker actors could be provoked into military action or nuclear terrorism — an asymmetrical response to asymmetrical power. While the safeguarding of fissile materials addressed the supply side of terrorism, it was also necessary to address the demand side of terrorism. Since threats and intimidation only increased paranoia, recruitment to terrorism and popular support for nuclear weapons, the better tactic and real path to security was to make one's enemy more secure. Failure to disarm created an atmosphere of bad faith, demoralization, intimidation and humiliation. It was time to replace war by more effective methods of tension reduction, violence prevention and conflict transformation.

53. **Mr. Konishi** (Nihon Hidankyo), issuing an appeal on behalf of atomic-bomb survivors (*Hibakusha*), called for the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and for immediate action to eliminate all nuclear arsenals. At the age of 16 years, he had seen the blinding flash of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and had watched the city become engulfed in flames. He could still hear the cries of tens of thousands of mothers and children and the voice of a dying man begging for water. The cruel and inhuman after-effects of that hell on earth were still being felt and would be for generations to come.

54. Survivors were horrified by reports that the United States was developing "usable" or "combat" nuclear weapons. It called on all Governments to heed the lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to begin multilateral negotiations immediately on a convention with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. He concluded by reading out one of the poems of Sankichi Toge, a deceased Hiroshima poet.

55. **Ms. Mohtasham** (Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards System) observed that the concerns about the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme had arisen because it had breached its IAEA safeguards agreement by failing for two decades to report the technical details of the programme, and they had been heightened by accusations, by the United States and its allies, that the Islamic Republic was a sponsor of terrorism. In the country itself, there had been no public debate over how national security interests related to the question of terrorism, or to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, yet an open debate would surely improve its relations with the West.

56. On the other hand, there were positive signs of the Islamic Republic of Iran's commitment to the NPT. It had, after all, actively cooperated with the IAEA to rectify its past failures, as evidenced in its detailed report to the Agency in 2003 and its signing of an IAEA additional protocol that same year, with assurances of immediate implementation. It had voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment in 2003. Its first report under the additional protocol, submitted in 2004, had provided voluminous information about its nuclear programme, and in January 2005 IAEA inspectors had been given access to a number of military sites suspected of nuclear activities. Moreover, negotiations since 2003 with several members of the European Union had shown a willingness on its part to work to resolve problems.

57. To assuage any political and technological concerns, the Islamic Republic of Iran should increase transparency in all areas of its nuclear programme, including its civilian nuclear capacity, and explain the exact nature of its relations with groups classified as terrorist by the West. The international community's emotional and psychological concerns about the Islamic Republic's political system and its commitment to peace must also be dealt with.

58. Like other non-nuclear-weapon States, the Islamic Republic of Iran wanted from the nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances and tangible movement towards disarmament. There was a widely held perception among Iranians that in the entire Middle East, South and Central Asia and the

Caucasus theirs was the only major country with inadequate security protection, and some Iranians had viewed its civilian nuclear programme as constituting a latent nuclear deterrent, similar to the full nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities in Japan. It was therefore vital in any discussion of its nuclear programme to take a wider perspective and to take its legitimate security concerns fully into account.

59. A military attack on known Iranian nuclear facilities would generate further security problems for the whole region and would cause the Islamic Republic of Iran to withdraw from the NPT and embark unreservedly on a nuclear-weapons programme. Clearly, diplomatic solutions must be pursued instead.

60. **Mr. Smylie** (World Conference of Religions for Peace) said that for more than 30 years the interfaith community had come together in various configurations to advocate both an end to war and an end to the weapons and systems with which wars were fought. The core texts and traditions of the religions of the world were the basis of common commitments of religious people. The World Conference's periodic assemblies had issued affirmations about all aspects of human life in the community, sustainable development and the environment, the viability of international instruments of governance and order, and human rights and justice. Yet no right seemed more fundamental than the right to peace and security.

61. General and complete disarmament was the ultimate goal and therefore religions had regularly called for: an end to nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal; the abolition and dismantling of all nuclear weapons and the cessation of weapons research; the cessation of all nuclear testing in all environments; an end to the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; non-use assurances by the nuclear-weapon Powers pending final elimination of nuclear weapons; support for existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the creation of new ones in the Middle East and Central and North-East Asia; a reduction of military expenses by all countries and the redirection of the resources towards human development; and the designation of the production, sale and use of weapons of mass destruction as crimes against humanity, with judicial mechanisms to hold offenders accountable.

62. The World Conference of Religions for Peace called on Governments and intergovernmental bodies to pursue conflict resolution by non-violent means and to renew their commitment to the quest for peace through justice.

63. **Mr. Cheong** Wooksik (Peace Depot) said that the hostility between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had reached crisis proportions since the last Review Conference, with dire consequences for the NPT process. In 2000, a historic inter-Korean summit meeting had raised high hopes of ending the cold war on the Korean peninsula, but that positive development had come to a full stop with the change of leadership in the White House in 2001. The Bush Administration had unilaterally repudiated the new relationship between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to which the Clinton Administration had been committed, and the situation had steadily deteriorated from then on until, in 2003, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had withdrawn from the Treaty and, in 2005, had announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defence. Both countries bore full responsibility for the current proliferation crisis in North-East Asia, but especially the Bush Administration because of its hard-line, hostile policy, which had undoubtedly raised fears of a possible attack, given the recent illegal United States invasion of Iraq. It was incumbent therefore upon the United States, to undertake confidence-building measures to remove the deep distrust and fear in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

64. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must return to the indispensable six-party talks on that nuclear crisis as soon as possible; but the two main antagonists must engage in direct talks as well, and it was to be hoped that the United States would show flexibility in negotiating and make a realistic offer to a Government that had expressed its willingness in the past to give up its nuclear-weapons programme.

65. It was disappointing that Japan, following the obsolete approach of clinging to dependence on United States nuclear protection, had decided to join in the United States missile defence system and that his own Government, the Republic of Korea, was about to follow suit. His organization urged all States in the area to establish an innovative regional cooperative security system, eventually discarding bilateral military security agreements. The Government of Japan and his own Government, working with their civil societies,

must take the lead in establishing a new kind of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. In 2004, a number of NGOs and experts of the region had developed a draft Model Treaty for the North-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, as a first step: it was a six-party treaty involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan as the central players, and three nuclear-weapon States — China, the Russian Federation and the United States — as supporting players that would provide negative security assurances. Further negotiations on such a zone could proceed in the context of the six-party talks.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.